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“A man who does not know the truth is just an idiot. 
But a man who knows the truth and calls it a lie is a crook” 
 
Bertolt Brecht
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
This project discusses about Credit Rating Agencies and the conflict of interests that they 
face with its clients; those entities assessed and being rated. 
This is a very interesting topic since, as it will be analysed, Credit Rating Agencies´ 
performance have huge impact in the economy, affecting the whole world. Nevertheless, few 
people know about them, how they work, its composition, and the crucial role that they play 
in the economy. 
By writing this essay I want people to realize how important those entities are due to its 
reference role which facilitate funding worldwide. However, its business practice is still too 
murky so stricter rulers and supervision measures are required.  
For investigating this subject, a research of different economic magnitudes such as risk 
premium and market index, from two different countries, will be done. Also a real case will 
be presented as a consequence of the bad practice of Credit Rating Agencies due to lack of  
enough supervision. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The recent financial crisis (2006-2008) that has affected the whole world, has made people 
think deeply about it. Situations like this make us doubt whether the economy is well 
regularized, if economic agents are well structured, if there are enough supervision measures 
and agents to carry them out… 
Nowadays, one of the economic agents that have a huge influence on the economic world 
and also played an important role in the crisis are The Credit Rating Agencies. Particularly, 
after the crisis, its performances, rights and obligations have been much criticized, even they 
have been incriminated of scam. 
The aim of this essay is to present the role of The Rating Agencies in the markets as information 
intermediaries; analyse its main characteristics and observe how their rates affect different 
economic magnitudes such as risk premium and market index. 
 
2.  BACKGROUND 
Credit Rating Agencies, also called CRAs, emerged in United States, with the railway boom 
(1860) to measure the risk of investing on railways. Standard & Poor’s was the first one to 
set up in 1860, then Moody's (1906) and Fitch appeared. In 1924 Moody's ratings covered 
almost 100% of the bond market in the U.S. (Ruiz Saiz, 2012) 
2.1 Standard and Poor´s 
Henry Varnum Poors (USA) saw in the railway boom a business opportunity. He published 
a book based on financial and operational railways and canals U.S. information, “History of 
Railroads and Canals in the United States” (1860). It was a collection of the main financial 
and operational railway companies in United States and information concerning them. 
Henry Varnum Poors and his son William founded a company, “H.V. and H.W. Poor Co” 
which published an annual and updated version of this book. 
A few years later, in 1906, Luther Lee Blake founded the Standard Statistics Bureau, in order 
to provide the same information about non-railway companies. The two companies merged 
in 1941 to become Standard & Poor's Corp. 
The company was acquired by McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. in 1966. 
2.2 Moody´s 
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In 1900 John Moody (New Jersey, USA) published “Manual of Industrial and Miscellaneous 
Securities”, its first assessment of the stock market; and founded John Moody & Company. 
The sale of this handbook was a success. (Efxto, 2013) 
The 1907 crack lead to an increase in the demand of independent financial analysis such as 
the handbook published by John Moody, however he was forced to sell his business due to 
lack of capital. 
As mentioned before, at that time, in the U.S. there was a large market of private bonds for 
finance the booming railway industry, so Moody's came back in 1909; publishing “Analysis 
of Railroad Investments”. This handbook was exclusively focused on railway sector bond 
market and was the first book to make assessments with a letter scale. John Moody is known 
for making up the triple and double letter grades (A, AA, AAA ...)  
Also, it was the first company that started to publish government bonds’ ratings in an 
extensive and accessible way. Additionally, it was the pioneer on charging a subscription fee 
to investors for the rating information. 
2.3 Fitch 
The company was founded by John Knowles Fitch on December 24, 1913 in New York as 
Fitch Publishing Company. In 1997 it merged with IBCA Limited based in London, which 
main owner is Fimalac, a French holding company. It is the smallest of the three Rating 
Agencies described above. 
Nowadays, there are more than 72 rating agencies from small size to large ones. They are 
engaged in assessing the credit risk associated with debt securities or structured finance 
instruments - including government bonds, CDs, corporate bonds, municipal bonds, 
collateralize securities (CDOs) or mortgage-backed securities -, borrowing entities, and even 
the creditworthiness of governments and their securities. 
Credit risk is the risk that a lender face due to the possibility that the borrower does not 
return to him the money or does not pay the corresponding interests. 
The risk evaluation of these obligations is determined by the probability that the debt issuer 
(the borrower) will fail to make the related interest payments on the debt, combined with 
other environmental factors. 
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Despite the wide variety of rating agencies existing in the world, 95%1 (Alessi, Wolverson, & 
Aly Sergie, 2013) of the market is dominated by 3 agencies: Standard & Poor’s, Moody´s and 
Fitch, resulting in an oligopoly. It is for this reason that they are called “The Big Three”. 
Standard & Poor’s is the largest one with more than 1,400 analyst in 25 countries and 1.2 
million credit ratings published. (Standard&Poor´s Rating Services, 2014) Its way of 
evaluation is focused on the borrower´s ability to meet its financial obligations in full and on 
time. Standard & Poor’s is closely followed by Moody´s with 1 million ratings and 1,200 
analyst and supervisors. Moody´s way of evaluation is focused on measuring the loss that the 
investor may suffer if the borrower defaults on its obligations. Then, it is Fitch with 350,000 
ratings published. 
This oligopoly is due to the reputation that those Rating Agencies have, that make investors 
trust on them. It is also partly prompted by some legal requirements that Federal Reserve or 
the European Central Bank have imposed to companies, in which a minimum rate given by 
one or even two of the Three Big Rating agencies are required for investing in certain assets.2 
Credit Rating Agencies have a crucial financial role. A credit rating has a direct impact on the 
interest rate a security pays out: a lower rating (according to the Rating Agency, high 
probability of default) leads to higher interest rates. 
As Bolsas y Mercados Españoles from now on BME, specifies on its webpage “lower grades 
are awarded to those issues of greatest risk, that is, lower grades are given to those issuers 
for which higher risk of default is charged. The bonds with high profitability, called high-
yield bonds, are issued by lower-rated issuers.” 
Therefore, these ratings, mainly given by the Three Big Rating Agencies, are very important 
since the financial expenses of the entity depend on them: a lower rating force the issuing 
entity to issue bonds at higher rate, to compensate the investor´s risk. (BME , 2014) 
Furthermore, Credit Rating Agencies facilitate to companies, banks and governments the 
access to bond markets all around the world. They also help investors to measure the risk of 
lending money to rated entities, providing a comparable worldwide reference; being that The 
                                                          
 
1 "The three major rating agencies hold a collective market share of roughly 95 percent. Their special status has 
been cemented by law—at first only in the United States, but then in Europe as well," explains an analysis 
by Deutsche Welle. 
2 In United States those limitations have been almost eliminated with the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 
2006. 
Basel II, which were recommendations on banking laws and regulations issued by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, gave to the Rating Agencies a crucial role. However, in 2013, Basel II was updated with 
Basel III, being one of the main changes the removal of the Credit Rating Agencies’ role. 
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Three Big Agencies use a letter-classification known by all investors. As described by the 
BME, The Three Big Agencies use an alphabetical classification system with added numbers. 
As it can be viewed in Table 1(attached), the highest possible rating assigned to the bonds of 
an issuer by Moody´s Agency is Aaa; for Standard&Poor’s (S&P) is AAA and for Fitch is 
also AAA. The rating CCC (S&P and Fitch) or Ca (Moody´s) considers the issue as highly 
speculative with great risk and great uncertainty. DD stands for an issuer in default. Being in 
default means a situation in which the issuing entity of the debt, has fail to meet the legal 
obligations of the debt, has unpaid several coupons. 
Investors value and trust on these ratings because they are “independent” from the 
institutions where they will invest. 
What is more, all this means that investors are not limited solely to investing in known 
businesses by them, they can invest globally thanks to these ratings and the information 
given. So an investor can invest in a company that he had never heard about it before, 
because with the rating he is able to estimate its financial status. However, investors need to 
be aware that Credit Rating Agencies only provide investment advice, focusing solely on the 
assessment of default risk. 
Ratings provided by the Rating Agencies have other functions besides making easier 
investment and capital raising for companies, banks and sovereign issuers. Issuers use credit 
ratings as references for financing contracts. Examples include the maintenance requirement 
of the rating in order to renew a credit, or the right to terminate a contract due to a rating 
decline. (Palacios García, 2012) 
Moreover, some financial markets´ regulators limit the acquisition of certain emissions to 
financial institutions, demanding a minimum rating as an essential requirement. Thereby, 
limiting the risk acquired by several key sectors of the economy. Also, they are used as 
constrain in laws and financial regulations. 
 
3. RATING AGENCY´S BUSINESS MODEL 
Rating Agencies can be managed by two different kind of business model: 
3.1 Investor-pays model 
On the one hand, investor-pays model; based on subscribers´ payments. 
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In this model, ratings are not published publicly so investors who are not subscribed in the 
Rating Agency can not have access to the information. The main source of finance for the 
Agency is the subscription fee that subscribers pay for having access to the information of 
the ratings published. Credit Rating Agencies rate those entities that subscribers want to be 
rated, because they want information about them. Also Credit Rating Agencies can rate 
entities that they considered important for future subscribers. In any case, the assessed entity 
do not ask for an evaluation. 
There is no relationship between the Credit Rating Agency and the issuer of the rated debt, 
hence only public information is used by the Rating Agency for assessing the issuing entity. 
This is a negative point because using only public information may lead to inaccurate ratings, 
being that any crucial internal information is taken into account. 
The positive point is that as there is no relationship between the Credit Rating Agency and 
the issuer of the rated debt, there can not be any distortion of the ratings nor any conflict of 
interest, resulting in high transparency. 
Nonetheless, with the technological progress, the ratings and the reports were shared each 
time more easily among people who had not paid for them (by photocopies, fax, 
computers…) so “The Big Three” decided to adopt another business model (which will be 
explained below) over 70´s . At present time, there are also some small rating agencies that 
still use investor-pays model. 
3.2 Issuer-pays´ model 
On the other hand, from 1970´s until now, most of the large rating agencies are based on 
the issuer-pays´ model. 
The main differences with the other model is that the ratings are published publicly, so 
anyone has access to this information and that the one who pays to the Credit Rating Agency 
is the issuing entity, not the investors (subscribers). 
In this model, the issuing entity orders a solvency assessment and pays for the service and 
the given rate. This payment can be from $1,500 to $2,500,000 depending on the size and 
type of the security rated. For this reason, in this model, the issuers’ payments are the main 
source of funding for the agency, leaving subscribers in the background. After the request 
for the rating, the Credit Rating Agency assess the entity. However, in addition to public 
information that was used in the previous model, the Credit Rating Agency have access to 
more precise information -such as confidential information- due to the relationship that 
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exists between the issuing entity and the Credit Rating Agency. Hence, the last mentioned 
can have a more accurate and widespread view of the company being rated. 
Nevertheless, this situation leads to the problem of conflict of interest: Credit Rating 
Agencies are paid by the issuing entity for the assessment of their own creditworthiness; 
instead of being paid by the investor (as it was in the first model.) 
Obviously, Credit Rating Agencies are interested on serving their client´s wishes (sometimes 
pushed by them). Being that if their clients are not satisfy with the rating provided, they will 
deny the rating. (Zunzunegui, 2006) As a consequence, the rating will not be published nor 
the Credit Rating Agency will be paid for the service. Alternatively, the issuing entity can 
change of Agency without paying for the service, meaning a loss of a client to the Rating 
Agency. (Area de Cooperacion UVA) 
Conflicts of interest are widespread ethical problems and for that reason they deserve special 
attention. They are present in almost all human decisions, when we interact with others.  
Other examples of this kind of problems in the financial field could be the situation in which 
a financial analyst values positively but unfairly some shares of a company because the 
company where he/she works for is involved in trading such shares. Another example in the 
health sector could be a situation in which a doctor suggests to a patient performing certain 
tests or treatments in their own clinic or in another clinic in which the doctor has economic 
interests or which is owned by any familiar. 
This issue can be associated with the agency theory also called principal-agent theory. This 
relationship is defined as a relationship under which one or more person -the principal(s)- 
engage another person -the agent- to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision,, making authority to the agent. In this project, the principal is the 
company rated and the agent is the Credit Rating Agency.  
Both entities have their own utility function, what means that they have their own goals and 
values. On the other hand, both utility functions can conflict as they do not share same goals. 
The principal (company being rated) pays fees for being rated to the agent (Credit Rating 
Agency). This payment should provide the principal a kind of influence capacity on the rate 
given. If the principal is a key client, Credit Rating Agency is expected to satisfy them and 
probably will not downgrade its ratings or if they do, they will do it with caution.  
Lately, last mentioned model has been very criticized since the widespread doubt about the 
rating efficacy and transparency.  
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4. PERFORMANCE ISSUING ENTITY 
Within the most commonly used model nowadays, the issuer-pays´ model, there are two 
possibilities of being rated. The first one is by requesting it. However, there also exists the 
possibility of being rated without requesting it. 
In the first case, the entity (private, public or sovereign entity) request a rating for different 
purposes.  
Often the issuing entity which want to be rated, sells bonds to raise money, since it is an easy 
and cheap way to borrow. A bond is a security that represents a promise to pay and it has 
the aim of obtaining finance for the bond issuer. The bond issuer can be a public institution, 
a supranational institution, a state, a regional government, a municipality or a private 
institution. 
For many investors, ratings are a critical element in pricing securities and are usually used as 
an investment guide. In other cases, as mentioned before, those credit ratings are used as 
references for financing agreements or needed as a requirement. The Big Three´s ratings are 
broadly used and clearly understood by all investors around the whole world, making a bond 
more attractive to a wider range of potential buyers and restricting business uncertainty. 
Nowadays credit ratings are crucial for reaching global markets since the issuer entity shares 
and communicates its financial situation certificated by a “famous trusty” Rating Agency. 
(Moody´s, 2014) In fact, developing countries depend on strong sovereign credit ratings to 
access funding in international bond markets. 
After the rating application, the initial rating meeting is held, in which the issuer supply to 
the Rating Agency some crucial information such as “background and history of the entity, 
industry trends, national political and regulatory environment, management quality, 
experience, attitude toward risk-taking, management structure, corporate and debt structure 
and financial position among others”, as Moody´s states in its webpage. 
For studying the issuer entity, the Credit Rating Agency assigns a lead analyst to prepare a 
recommendation to the rating committee. The Rating Agency Committee analyses and 
evaluates all the information in an objectively way, taking into account both public and 
private information about the entity. At the end of the process, which is strictly confidential, 
the issuer will be informed of the rating given.  
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If the issuing entity thinks that the rate is unfair or it is dissatisfied with it, the client is able 
to appeal to the Rating Agency. The client also have the right to choose whether its rating 
will be made public or not, or public it with a limitation. 
Commonly, a new rating is distributed by press release simultaneously to the major financial 
media worldwide. This press release will also appear on the corresponding website of the 
Credit Rating Agency that has issued the rating such as: www.moodys.com, 
www.standardandpoors.com or www.fitchratings.com; as well as on other relevant regional 
and local media. 
A professional relationship between the issuer entity and the Credit Rating Agency is set up 
once being rated. This relationship is also viewed as a batches´ sale, by which rating agencies 
assess an issuing entity with the condition that the issuing entity undertakes to use the same 
rating agency for future emissions. This means that the issuing entity is committed to using 
the service of that Rating Agency. 
Periodically, at least annually, the agency will get in touch with the entity for assessing the 
evolution of the company and request significant additional information. Now, according to 
the MEMO/13/13 European Commission with reference to sovereign countries, sovereign 
ratings would have to be reviewed at least every six months (rather than every 12 months as 
it was currently being applied under general rules). (European Commission, 2013) 
On the other hand, there also exists the possibility of being rated without requesting it.  
The rating agency rates a company or a sovereign state only with public information, being 
that it does not imply any meeting between the credit rating agency and the entity rated. 
This service do not involve any payment since the issuing entity has not apply for the service. 
However, sometimes, the Credit Rating Agency gives an unsolicited rating to an entity 
pretending to be paid (by the entity) for assessing the entity in the future It is like going 
fishing; first drop a line (CRA gives an unsolicited rating) and then they wait until the entity 
hook (the entity hire their services in the future.) 
It can be appreciated that this situation is related with a marketing strategy, marketing 
inbound/pull strategy. The Three Big Rating Agencies have already a high visible and known 
name. All investors in the world and all companies know who those agencies are and the 
prestige that they have. So clients seek out their services in an active way. Those Rating 
Agencies have a customer relationship management and for engage clients, they use 
discounts and promotions on their services. 
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Several researches have proven that unsolicited rating are lower and less accurate than 
solicited ratings, one of the reasons is the lack of the business´ private internal information. 
(National Bank of Belgium, 2006) 
Later we will address this issue, analysing an unsolicited rating case, the Hannover case. 
 
5. GOVERNMENTS AS ISSUERS 
Governments and countries also want to take advantage of being rated. Besides increasing 
the number of potential investors, sometimes they need a rating for legal issues. Other times, 
Credit Rating Agencies convince sovereign States of the necessity of their services, telling 
them that the ratings will take place regardless of the decision of the State and that it is better 
for the State to "cooperate" instead of facing a rating. (Ugeux, 2011) 
Sometimes, sovereign bonds3 must have been rated by at least two independent entities to 
enter the market. Therefore, the regular process is that countries go to any of the Big Three 
- S&P, Moody's or Fitch- to ask them for a credit rating for their debt. This service, as well 
as for any company, is paid; although those fees paid by sovereign entities are confidential 
data difficult to obtain. 
In Spain, Dirección General del Tesoro y Política Financiera, which depends on Ministry of 
Finance, has been engaging Moody's and Standard & Poor's (S&P)´s services, since many 
international investors require that the Spanish public debt has a minimum rating of one or 
two agencies to be able to acquire it. 
Concretely in 2009, the Spanish Government paid half a million euros for rating Spanish 
debt. And in 2010 (Caballero, 2010), the Spanish government paid between 365,000 and 
530,000 euros to the Three Big agencies (S & P, Moody's and Fitch) to get a credit rating.  
However, there are some governments, which do not want to be rated by these Credit Rating 
Agencies. Those countries are: Belgium, Australia, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, 
Argentina, France, Switzerland, UK and USA. 
These countries do not want their debt to be rated. So, when one of these countries is rated 
(without paying any fee, of course), it is called an “unsolicited rating”. 
                                                          
3 In Europe, government bonds are also known as sovereign bonds. In UK, government bonds are also known 
as "gilts"; in France, as "OATs"; in Germany as "Bunds"; in Italy,"BTPs". In the United States, government 
bonds are also known as "U.S. Treasuries" or "T-Bills" –  
 (AFME, Association for Financial Markets in Europe., 2014) 
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“Ratings Services may also assign Unsolicited Credit Ratings when Ratings Services: (a) 
believes sufficient market interest exists for the Rated Entity or (b) uses the Unsolicited 
Credit Rating as a component of its Credit Ratings on other Rated Entities (e.g., a credit 
support provider or a dependent Credit Rating for another Rated Entity)” (Standard&Poor´s, 
2012) as Standard and Poor’s indicate in their web page. 
Also, Moody´s affirm that “As a publisher of opinions about credit, MIS4 reserves the right 
to issue unsolicited Credit Ratings. The purpose of this policy is to provide greater 
transparency to market participants with respect to published Credit Ratings that are initiated 
by MIS EU5” 
Other reason why The Big Three Rating Agencies (S&P, Moody´s and Fitch) rate these 
governments is among others, because there are companies which are in those countries that 
do want a rating.  
 
6. CRAs´ STOCKHOLDERS AND RESPONSIBILITY 
Although information about the The Big Three Rating Agencies’ composition is quite 
difficult to obtain, -which may imply lack of transparency- in this paragraph we will discuss 
about it. 
STANDARD AND POORS – It belongs to the publisher  McGraw-Hill Companies, 
which is a publicly traded company, also called in United Kingdom as public limited 
company. Its business has a direct relation with education. McGraw´s main shareholder is 
Capital Group (12, 3%). Other relevant shareholders are Vanguard Group which is an 
American investment management company, Black Rock which is a 
multinational investment management corporation based in New York City, the investment 
bank Oppenheimer Funds, the investment company T. Rowe Price, Fiduciary Management, 
Independent Franchise Partners… 
MOODY´S – Belongs to Moody's Corporation and it shares its main stockholders 
with S&P: Capital Group; State Street; Black Rock; Vanguard Group; and T Rowe Price; all 
of them from the financial sector. Other important shareholders that are not shared with 
S&P are Berkshire Hathaway Inc (12, 47%), Capital Research Global Investors (part of 
Capital Group), Value Act Capital Management, Neuberger Berman and Invesco Advisers. 
                                                          
4 MIS refers to Moody´s Investors Service, Inc.  
5 MIS EU refers to those MIS entities registered in the European Union pursuant to the EU regulation for 
credit rating agencies. 
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Both Moody's and McGraw are headquartered in Manhattan. 
FITCH – Also called Fitch Group, Fitch Rating or Fitch Inc, headquartered in New 
York and in London. 
Its shareholders are divided in two: 60% Fimalac (Financière Marc de Lacharrière) in Paris 
and The Hearst Corporation 40% (publisher of several newspapers and magazines). 
It should be highlighted that those companies which are Credit Ratings´s shareholders are 
also rated by The Three Big Rating Agencies.  
For example: Capital Group is a shareholder (12.5%) of McGraw-Hill Cos (S&P´s owner). 
S&P rates Capital Group, so here we can appreciate an indirect relation. The company being 
assessed is shareholder of the owner of the rating entity; with the possibility of influence on 
its ratings. The same happens with Moody´s as Capital Group is also a strong shareholder of 
Moody´s. 
On the other hand, Capital Group is a company which operates on the financial sector. This 
is a very sensitive sector, for this reason, ratings given to other companies in this sector will 
affect directly to the company more than if it was another sector. As we have just said, Capital 
Group is an influential shareholder of two CRAs so this company could influence on the 
financial sector to take advantage of the situation. Situations such as large losses of a big 
companies in the sector can be one of the consequences. Situations like the one just 
mentioned can impact the market, decreasing market´s transparency. 
A fact quite impressive since Rating Agencies should be completely independent from both 
the company going to be evaluated, and surely independent from the sector in which it 
operates. The European Commission MEMO/13/13, has issued a limitation about this 
subject: 
“If a shareholder of a CRA holds an important position in other CRAs or in an instrument 
rated by a CRA, this could lead to a conflict of interest that could affect the quality of ratings. 
To this end the compromise introduces limitations on shareholding in CRAs: 
(1) 5% limitation in cross-shareholding of a CRA; 
(2) A disclosure regime for rating instruments of shareholders holding more than 
5%; and 
(3) A prohibition for rating instruments of shareholders holding more than 10%.” 
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With those limitations the European Commission pretends to enforce the independence of 
the Rating Agencies from their shareholders and from other CRAs. Also as being 
established: “the new rules will require CRAs to disclose publicly if a shareholder with 5% 
or more of the capital or voting rights of the CRA holds 5% or more of a rated entity, and 
would prohibit a shareholder of a CRA with 10% or more of the capital or voting rights 
from holding 10% or more of a rated entity.” 
A European Commission proposal for 2014 is to make stricter the existing laws concerning 
independence of CRAs. They have proposed a “rotation of the debt issuers every 3 years 
between the agencies that rate them. What is more, ratings from two different rating agencies 
would be mandatory for complex debt investments. A big shareholder of a credit rating 
agency could not simultaneously be a big shareholder in a competitor” as it is commented in 
the European Commission webpage. 
A fact to be foregrounded is that rating agencies are classified as private agencies, they do 
not have any legal responsibility. Ratings represents mere opinions on credit quality and do 
not guarantee the product or a recommendation for purchase. 
In fact, U.S. rating agencies have got the protection of freedom of speech, the same that 
protects freedom of the press; to shield against claims of investors harmed by their bad 
practices. Meaning that they do not respond to damages caused by their performance.  
For all the above commented, CRAs´ “opinion” should not impact significantly, rather 
negative nor positively in the economy. 
In this essay we want to analyse i) if the ratings affects directly or indirectly the economy, 
and if so, how and the degree of importance of those effects. ii)Also, it will be analysed if 
there is any conflict of interest between Credit Rating Agencies and companies and if so, 
how it is reflected.  
 
7. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 
For studying the first point i) the existence of a relationship between the ratings received by 
a country and its impact on the economy, we will study two different countries, concretely 
Portugal and France. We think that studying the impact on a country is the best way of doing 
this analysis since an effect on a country will affect also the entities and companies established 
in that country.  
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Portugal has been selected because Portugal was one of the European countries “rescued” 
along with Ireland and Greece. What is more, in October 2011, European Commission 
considered the idea of prohibiting Rating Agencies to publish ratings on rescued EU 
countries, since the ratings could exacerbate the debt crisis in the Eurozone. (Nieto, 2011) 
The Government of Portugal blamed them about the crucial situation that was facing 
Portugal, when its debt was rated as junk bond. By analysing it, we will see if those 
arraignments were true, if Portugal arrived at that situation alone by its bad management or 
if Rating Agencies helped this country sink.  
On the other hand, France has been selected as it is viewed as a strong country that has not 
been one of the worst in Europe. For summarizing, two European countries with very 
different situation have been selected for analyse the impact of CRAs in different 
environments. 
As a measure of the impact on the economy, there will be considered two quantities with 
different meanings: premium risk and the stock market index. 
Premium risk is an index that refers to the interest that a state has to pay to investors who 
have lent money to the State by buying some of its debt (in the form of debt securities, 
bonds). The risk premium is established by comparing the German 10 year’s bond, as it is 
considered the safest. 
As an example: if  Spain sells sovereign bonds (debt security) at an interest of 5% and 
Germany does so with a rate of 1%, the difference between the two is 4%, or what is the 
same, the Spanish risk premium would be 400 points. 
An increase in the premium risk of a country implies an increase in the interest rate. (Hoyos 
Miller, 2013) 
The stock market index is an indicator of the market´s evolution based on the behaviour of 
the prices of the most representative securities. The stock market index that we will use in 
this essay will be the one of Portugal, the PSI 20 index and the most important of France, 
CAC 40 index. 
We have obtained all data with reference to both index in the webpage datosmacro.com. 
There, it is shown the stock market index as a number expressed in basis points and as a 
percentage. The percentage shows the increase or decrease of the index and it is quite similar 
among different stock indexes. The number expressed in basis points vary a lot among 
different indexes because each index has started from a different basis called “market basis”. 
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The market basis of an index is a number in which an index starts to be traded on a stock 
exchange. The market basis is a number without importance, it is the same choosing 5,000 
points as a base or 1,500 points, since the important factor is the variation of the index.  
The base value of the CAC 40 index was established in 1987 and it was 1,000 basis points. 
The base value of PSI 20 index is 3,000 basis points. 
First of all, we will study how a rating given, in the first case to France, and then to Portugal 
affects the risk premium of each country.  
Due to the scarcity of data, we have taken all the ratings given by Standard and Poor´s, 
Moody´s and Fitch, in this order. As the Three Credit Rating Agencies use different ways to 
rate, an equivalence table (see Table 1 attached) has been used for comparing the three kind 
of ratings. Then all ratings have been equated taking the S&P model as a base.  
As mentioned before, all data has been acquired from the webpage datosmacro.com. Here 
we find the risk premium of both countries, expressed in basis points; and its variation. 
7.1 France 
7.1.1 Risk premium 
Talking about France, our sample period spans from 25/07/2005 to 02/04/2014. The 
sample has been focused on this period because it was not significant to take previous ratings. 
As it can be noticed, France´s premium risk has evolved in a moderate ascending way until 
July 2011. During this period the risk premium did not exceed the 60 points, a figure that 
only reached in January and March, 2009. 
GRAPH 1 
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It is in July 2011 when it exceeded the previous maximum (60 basis points). From that 
moment on, the risk premium evolution is sharply upwards until 16/11/2011, when it 
reaches a peak point, 189 points. 
After this date, the risk premium vary a lot but without attaining a maximum as the above 
mentioned. 
From August until the end of the sample, it has begun a gradual downward trend. 
After contextualized France´s risk premium, we are going to reduce and adapt our sample to 
the ratings issued. The first rating found in our sample is on the 13/07/2011, so we will 
focus on studying the period from that date on. 
GRAPH 2 
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The following ratings are issued the 20/12/2011 and the 13/01/2012, on the first one Fitch 
outlook change into a negative one and on the second date S&P does the same. 
Theoretically, both ratings should affect the risk premium in a negative way; nevertheless, 
the impact of the first rating is positive since the risk Premium decreases in the six following 
days. After those days, it is true that the risk premium increases, however it is not an 
immediately consequence of the rating downgraded. 
Therefore, at first glance there is no direct and positive relationship between France´s risk 
premium and the ratings given by the Big Three Rating Agencies. 
In the following lines a statistical analysis will be featured. It will consists on proving if there 
exists any relationship between France´s risk premium and the ratings received by any of the 
Big Three Credit Rating Agencies. For it, we will use a regression model with two dummy 
variables: 
 
ΔYt = β0 + β1ΔYt-1 + β2ΔYt-2 + β3ΔYt-3 + β4ΔYt-4 + β5ΔYt-5 + β6DRP+ β7DRN 
 
 
ΔYt = Risk Premium variation 
β0 = intercept 
ΔYt-1 = Risk Premium variation of the previous day 
ΔYt-2 = Risk Premium variation of 2 days before 
ΔYt-3 = … 
DRP = It is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the rating is positive and it takes 
the vale 0 when there is no rating. 
DRN =It is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 when the rating is negative and it takes 
the vale 0 when there is no rating. 
Considering by a positive rating a credit rating that has improved with respect to the previous 
one (see Table 1 attached for the classifications) or when the outlook of the rating has been 
improved. 
We have considered a negative rating when the credit rating is worse than the previous one 
or when the outlook is worse than the previous one. 
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In the case that the same rating as the previous one has been broadcast, and being the outlook 
negative, we have considered that the rating will adversely affect the regression model; so the 
rating is considered as negative. However if the outlook is stable (being the rating equal as 
that one given previously), we will consider it as a positive rating. Obviously, with a positive 
outlook and being the rating equal to the one given previously, the rating is considered 
positive as well. 
Statistical delays of 5 (one week) have been added to the model in order to fix the problems 
of autocorrelation in the model. 
The following results were obtained: 
 
FRANCE´S RISK PREMIUM SUMMARY   
 
  Coefficient Standard     error Statistical t P-value 
β0 (Intercept) -0,002 0,002 -0,812 0,417 
β1 -0,021 0,034 -0,624 0,533 
β2 0,006 0,034 0,185 0,854 
β3 -0,047 0,034 -1,362 0,174 
β4 0,028 0,034 0,804 0,422 
β5 -0,049 0,034 -1,429 0,153 
β6 (Positive dummy) -0,002 0,013 -0,185 0,853 
β7 (Negative dummy) 0,026 0,015 1,719 0,086 
 
β6 coefficient associated with positive rating dummy variable is not significant. Thereby, the 
null hypothesis (coefficient equal to zero) can not be rejected. 
Nevertheless, β7 coefficient associated with negative rating dummy variable is positively 
presented as significant at 8.6% level. This result allows us to reject the null hypothesis and 
therefore, it can be said that risk premium is affected by negative ratings´ emissions. So 
looking at the positive sign that the coefficient β7 has, we can say that a negative rating 
broadcast will increase risk premium; meaning less solvency and high risk.  
The other variables included in the model are not significant. 
7.1.2 Stock market index – CAC 40 
Another way to study the existence of a relation between the ratings received by a country 
and its impact on the economy, it is by using the stock market index. In this study we will 
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investigate the stock market index of France which is the CAC 40. Then, we will compare 
the results with the ones obtained by the risk premium. 
The CAC 40 is a weighted measure, according to the capitalization of the 40 most significant 
values among the 100 largest companies traded on the Paris Stock Exchange. As it is 
explained in the economic dictionary of Expansion, the value of the CAC 40 index is 
published every 30 seconds, using the latest prices traded on Euronext real-time markets. 
The index value is calculated as the sum of the contribution multiplied by their corresponding 
weights and divided by the adjustment factor multiplied by the capitalization basis. 
GRAPH 3 
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Adding the broadcast dates of the ratings given (both positive and negative ratings), it can 
be highlighted that the majority of ratings are negative until July 2013. However from this 
date on, most of the rating issued are positive. This is consistent with the fact that if we look 
at the index, the economy is improving.  
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GRAPH 4
 
 
We will use a statistical model similar to one used for the risk premium. However, we will 
swap the risk premium variation by the index variation. Moreover, in this model we have not 
incorporated the other variables included in the previous model as they were not significant. 
In any case, it have to be commented that similar results were obtained using the same 
statistical model (with statistical delays) as the one used for the risk premium. 
 
   ΔYt = β0 + β1ΔYt-1 + β2DRP+ β3DRN 
 
ΔYt = Risk Premium variation 
β0 = intercept 
ΔYt-1 = Risk Premium variation of the previous day 
DRP = It is a variable dummy which takes the value 1 when the rating is positive and it takes 
the vale 0 when there is no rating. 
DRN = It is a variable dummy which takes the value 1 when the rating is negative and it 
takes the vale 0 when there is no rating. 
The results are as follow:  
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  Coefficient Standard error Statistical t P - value 
β0 (Intercept) 0.000 0.000 -0.019 0.985 
β1 0.015 0.035 0.443 0.658 
β2 (Positive dummy) 0.000 0.003 -0.141 0.888 
β3 (Negative dummy) 0.005 0.004 1.457 0.146 
 
In the CAC 40 results table, the data obtained shows that β2 and β3 coefficients associated 
respectively to positive and negative rating dummy variables, are not displayed as significant. 
So the null hypothesis can not be rejected. For that reason, this results will not be taken into 
account. 
 
7.2 Portugal 
7.2.1 Risk premium 
Talking about Portugal, our sample period spans from 20/08/2009 to 10/03/2014. The 
sample has been focused on this period because it was not significant to take previous ratings 
since the previous credit rating was far away from the sample selected. 
Portugal´s risk premium can be divided in two periods. In the first one, the risk premium 
has an uphill evolution until 30/01/2012 which reaches its highest peak with 1,560 points. 
From that date, the evolution of the risk premium has begun to fall down. 
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We can observe that in the first period until 30/01/2012, there is only a positive rating on 
the 05/04/2011, which had a direct impact on the risk premium, resulting in a fall of 27 
points on the following day. 
In the first period, all the other ratings were negative, experiencing an increase in the risk 
premium whenever a negative rating was issued. We can observe that this happens in all 
broadcast except in the case of 24/03/2010, that it does not experience any change after the 
news. 
From the peak point, there is also a predominance of negative ratings. On 13/01/2012, the 
risk premium increases heavily by 195 points, after the announcement of a negative rating; 
On the 14/02/2012, the risk premium increases by 22 points maybe due to the publication 
of a negative rating, the 22/02/2012 it undergoes another increase due to a negative Fitch´s 
outlook, and so on. 
As an exception, the 06/03/2013 a positive rating is issued - an S&P´s stable outlook- which 
decreases the risk premium by 24 points. Likewise, on the 05/11/2013 we face another 
positive rating from Moody's which makes the risk premium decrease by 14 points next day. 
In view of this observations, Portugal´s risk premium is affected, in a positive direct way, by 
the ratings issued by the Three Rating Agencies. 
As done with France risk premium, a statistical analysis will be done with the same regression 
model. The results are below: 
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PORTUGAL´S RISK PREMIUM SUMMARY 
  Coefficient Standard error Statistical t P - value 
β0 Intercept  0.000 0.001 -0.347 0.729 
β1 0.215 0.032 6.783 0.000 
β2 0.004 0.032 0.134 0.893 
β3 0.012 0.032 0.383 0.702 
β4 -0.129 0.032 -3.995 0.000 
β5 0.043 0.032 1.360 0.174 
β6 (Positive dummy) 0.017 0.017 0.992 0.321 
β7 (Negative dummy) 0.013 0.007 1.947 0.052 
 
The data obtained in the above table show a different behaviour for the two variables studied 
(negative ratings and positive ratings). 
β6 coefficient associated with the positive rating dummy variable, is not displayed as 
significant. So the null hypothesis can not be rejected. However β7 coefficient associated with 
the negative rating dummy variable is positively displayed as significant at 5% level. This 
result allows us to reject the null hypothesis and therefore it can be said that risk premium is 
affected by the emission of negative ratings. Meaning that a negative rating broadcast will 
increase risk premium (less solvency, high risk).  
7.2.2 Stock market index – PSI 20 
On the other hand we will also look at Portugal´s index, the PSI 20 index6. 
The study of the PSI 20 index´s evolution will start in 2009, as in the case of France, due to 
lack of previous data. However this is not a problem since it is an appropriate date for our 
analysis as it is when we find more and more concentrated ratings of both countries. 
                                                          
6 The value of the PSI 20 index is published every 15 seconds, using the latest prices quoted on Euronext real-
time markets. The price index may be suspended if there are circumstances that do not allow proper calculation.  
The official opening value is calculated as soon as each company has received at least a price. The last published 
value of the PSI 20 index is the official index closing value for that trading day. 
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GRAPH 6
 
 
Over this period the maximum PSI 20 index is 8821.60 points on the 11/01/2010; its lowest 
mark otherwise, can be found on the 13/06/2012 with 4408.73 points. From this latter date, 
the index experiences an uptrend. 
As can be seen in the graph below, negative ratings predominate throughout the period.  
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As commented before, using the same statistical model as with Portugal´s risk premium, we 
obtain the following results: 
PSI 20 SUMMARY 
  Coefficient Standard error Statistical t P - value 
β0 Intercept 0.000 0.000 0.246 0.806 
β1 0.091 0.032 2.829 0.005 
β2 -0.022 0.032 -0.694 0.488 
β3 -0.059 0.032 -1.810 0.071 
β4 -0.038 0.032 -1.178 0.239 
β5 -0.047 0.032 -1.465 0.143 
β6 Positive dummy  -0.011 0.007 -1.566 0.118 
β7 Negative dummy  0.000 0,003 -0.119 0.906 
 
As we can appreciate neither positive broadcast nor negative broadcast are meaningful. For 
this reason we will reject the study of the index PSI 20 with relation to the ratings broadcast. 
After the study of both countries, we can appreciate that risk premium is the best indicator 
to analyse the impact that a broadcast of a rating has on a country´s economy. In both 
countries, there is a high probability (95% or more) that a negative rating broadcast increase 
the risk premium of the country. Therefore, we can underwrite that negative ratings imply 
an increase of the risk premium. 
The ones who rate a country are private entities –CRAs - which have not any legal 
responsibility with the rates given. As they have a direct impact on the risk premium of a 
country, they can provoke crucial impact on a country´s economy. For that reason, we are 
allowing them the possibility of leading a country to bankruptcy. With their opinion - as the 
Big Three called their ratings - they “play” with the economy without any consequences for 
them.  
An increase in the risk premium of a country can imply different consequences: 
On the one hand, an increase in the risk premium impacts directly on the country´s solvency, 
increasing its debt. This implies that State has to pay more money to finance itself because 
the investors demand high profitability as risk is supposed to be higher. 
What is more, risk premium also affects companies and banks. Financial institutions lend 
money among them. If risk premium increase, banks will lend money at higher rate among 
them (there is more risk, more probability of default). Meaning that banks which want to 
borrow money, will have to pay more, increasing their financial expenses. This will lead to 
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lower profit margin to the banks, which have a direct impact on their clients. Financial 
institutions will charge higher interest rates for borrowing to their clients (companies, other 
banks, particulars...) 
Higher interest rates for borrowing will entail negative consequences for the management 
and continuity of entrepreneurship; also increasing unemployment rate. 
Moreover, this situation could slow down consumption, as funding conditions would be 
worst. (Recio, 2011) 
Furthermore, the fact that only negative broadcast are meaningful can be explained. 
This fact has been proven by several surveys, which explained that negative economic news’ 
feedback is greater than responses to positive ones. However, this phenomenon does not 
happen only in the economic sector. According to several papers, bad news, feedback, or 
events in general have more impact than good ones. (Soroka, 2006). 
For this reason, we can conclude that our result is reasonable. 
 
8. HANNOVER UNSOLICITED RATING CASE 
For studying the second point ii) an unsolicited rating case will be analysed.  
As mentioned before, there also exists the possibility of being rated without requesting it: 
the rating agency rate a company or a sovereign entity with public information for free. 
As Van Roy (National Bank of Belgium, 2006) has proven, unsolicited ratings generally are 
lower than solicited ratings. This fact can be explained mainly because for obtaining an 
unsolicited rating, only public information is used. Also there are some issuing entities which 
think that unsolicited ratings are lower with the aim of pressuring debt issuers to acquire the 
CRA rating services. As an example we will describe, in the following lines the Hannover 
case. 
Hannover Re is a German reinsurer company and it is one of the most important reinsurers 
in the world, concretely the third one. “It transacts all lines of non-life and life and health 
reinsurance and is present on all continents” as it is presented in their webpage. 
Reinsurance is an insurance for insurance companies. The insurance company makes a 
contract with another special insurance company (called Reinsurance Company) for transfer 
to the last one mentioned part of the risk of ensuring its clients.  
The reinsure is an essential instrument for several reasons: 
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It is a risk factor reduction, avoiding huge losses and possible bankruptcies: an insurance 
company signs a contract of reinsurance as the risk of its contracts exceeds the tolerable 
limit, called full limit, which it could bear. 
Talking about finance, the reinsure is an instrument that enables insurance companies 
increase its business. This is due to the fact that they have a security backup of a reinsurance, 
meaning that they can accept greater risks and more insurance clients. Furthermore, this 
instrument stabilizes the insurance market by distributing the risk and responsibility against 
an insured entity. 
Working with prestigious reinsurer companies well positioned worldwide is very important 
for an insurance company, as their business is backed up by the reinsurer company. Hence, 
the amount of years on the business, their experience and business position are crucial 
characteristics that a reinsurance company must have for success. 
For all the above mentioned, negative ratings, negative news or any negative factor affects 
more those entities that any other. 
As a large company, Hannover Re Company operates with two Credit Rating Companies: 
Standard and Poor´s and A.M.Best (solicited ratings). The last one mentioned is a Credit 
Rating Agency focused exclusively on the insurance market. Both Agencies maintain a high 
rating: Standard & Poor's AA- (Very Strong) and A.M. Best A+ (Superior). As a regular 
client, Hannover Re pays to the two Agencies the corresponding fees. 
In October 21, 1998 the Credit Rating Agency Moody´s gave to Hannover Re an unsolicited 
rating, Aa2. Moody´s asked Hannover Re to collaborate with them, however, Hannover Re 
had already an engagement with two Credit Rating Agencies, so they did not want to be rated 
by another Agency and paying more fees for the service. 
Although Hannover Re did not want to be rated by another Credit Rating Agency, as they 
had already being rated, Moody´s continued rating them. However, besides rating the 
company, Moody´s was also pressuring Hannover to “collaborate” with them (pushing for 
taking on their services and therefore paying the corresponding fee).  
8.1 Purpose of unsolicited rating 
One of the theories that some economists hold is that the purpose of unsolicited ratings is 
making pressure on companies for making them contract rating services in the future. Even 
the Big Three has been accused of blackmailing for achieve its purposes. 
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In this case in particular, we can affirm that Hannover Re felt harassed by Moody´s Agency. 
As an example we can stand out a conversation in which Moody´s told Herbert Haas in 1998, 
the actual chief financial officer of  Hannover Re, that if Hannover paid for a rating, “it could 
have a positive impact" on Hannover´s rating.  
Although Hannover Re did not want to be rated, Moody´s continued to rate the company 
issuing unsolicited ratings and asking for “collaboration”. Each Moody´s rating emission was 
worse than the previous one; however, the other two CRA that rated the company: S&P and 
A.M Best were still given to Hannover strong and high ratings.  
In graph 8, this situation can be appreciated, and also the fact, commented before, that 
unsolicited rating are lower than solicited ratings. 
GRAPH 8 
 
 
For making the graph, historical prices of Hannover Re company shares have been obtained.  
First, data from Sabadell Bank webpage www.bsmarkets.com has been gathered, then 
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historical data has been complemented with the data in Hannover Re company webpage 
www.hannover-re.com, where there were previous data available. 
Historical Hannover ratings given by Moody´s and Standard&Poor´s have been obtained 
from their official webpage. For reaching this kind of data we had to sign up as a private 
company both in Moody´s as in Standard and Poor´s.  
Hannover Re Company has collaborated providing internal reports and useful information 
about these ratings, bearing out the information obtained in the Credit Rating Agencies 
webpage. 
As Credit Rating Agencies use different ways to rate, an equivalence table (See attached Table 
1.1) has been used for comparing both kind of ratings. Then Moody´s ratings have been 
equated taking the S&P model as a base.  
In order to capture the differences of the ratings between both companies, we have used a 
numerical scale, being AAA = 21; AA+ = 20 and D = 0; as it can be appreciated in the 
attached Table 1.1. 
A fact to be highlighted is that in mid-2008, Moody´s stopped to issue unsolicited ratings to 
Hannover Re. From that moment on, Hannover Re shares price launched, even reaching its 
peak point: 64.5 euros per share. 
The reason why Moody´s stopped rating Hannover Re according to Moody´s report was 
“business reasons.” "This issuer [Hannover Re Company] has declined Moody's invitation 
to participate in the rating process, and has not communicated with Moody's on credit-
related issues for at least 12 months," Moody's said in the statement. 
A peculiar statement, taking into account that Moody´s had been broadcasting unsolicited 
ratings for Hannover Re Company for at least 7 years, and that the company had refused to 
collaborate with them during all this years, not only in the last 12 months. 
In our opinion, this kind of performance can be considered as indirect threat, so it should 
be a crime. Due to this threats, Hannover Re lost a lot of millions. Concretely, after Moody´s 
announced a downgrade to Hannover until junk status, Hannover Re Company lower its 
market value by about 134 million euros, within hours. 
Hannover Re case is not a particular or unusual case. Other companies, even countries have 
complained about this kind of situations. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
As it has been proven, negative rating broadcast affects negatively the economy of a country 
and therefore, of any company within that country. For reaching these results, an analysis of 
two countries with totally different financial situation have been done. In the analysis, we 
have used two regression models for looking at risk premium and market index. As a result, 
we can conclude that economic word is clearly affected by Credit Rating Agencies. 
Credit Rating Agencies influence on the economy, so if they do not act in accordance with 
good professional practices, they are able to harm any entity. Nevertheless, taking into 
account agency theory, it has to be commented that it is not a one way manipulation 
relationship; also important and prestigious companies can influence in the ratings given -by 
the Three Big- to them. 
Gradually, and in particular after the economic and financial crisis of 2008, more laws have 
been established for regulating this entities (CRAs). However, CRAs and its surrounding 
sector is still an opaque field, with lack of sufficient and severe legal regulation.  
From my point of view, one of the main subjects to be addressed as soon as possible is the 
legal responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies´ performance. 
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11. ATTACHED 
TABLE 1 with explanation. 
 
Source: ftalphaville.ft.com 
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TABLE 1.1 with numerical scale for analysing Hannover Re case 
Moody´s S&P   Fitch    
Long Term Short Term Long Term Short Term Long Term Short Term   
Aaa   AAA   AAA   21 
Aa1   AA+   AA+   20 
Aa2   AA   AA   19 
Aa3   AA-   AA-   18 
A1   A+   A+   17 
A2   A   A   16 
A3   A-   A-   15 
Baa1   BBB+   BBB+   14 
Baa2   BBB   BBB   13 
Baa3   BBB-   BBB-   12 
Ba1   BB+   BB+   11 
Ba2   BB   BB   10 
Ba3   BB-   BB-   9 
B1   B+   B+   8 
B2   B   B   7 
B3   B-   B-   6 
Caa   CCC+   CCC   5 
Ca   CCC   CCC   4 
C   CCC-   CCC   3 
/   D   DDD   2 
/   D   DD   1 
/   D   D   0 
 
 
 
 
